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RELIGIOUS CLAIMS VS. NON-DISCRIMINATION 
RIGHTS: ANOTHER PLEA FOR DIFFICULTY 
Megan Pearson1 
In A Plea for Difficulty,2 Martha Nussbaum urged caution and 
nuance in the analysis of the relationship between religion and 
feminism. Her essay was written in response to Susan Okin’s prob-
lematizing of the relationship between multiculturalism and the 
protection of women’s rights and to Okin’s question of “what 
should be done when the claims of minority cultures or religions 
clash with the norm of gender equality that is at least formally 
endorsed by liberal states?”3 Okin argued that religion was hostile 
to women, and therefore there was a “considerable likelihood of 
tension between . . . feminism and a multiculturalist commitment 
to group rights for minority cultures.”4 This article does not con-
sider the question of multiculturalism per se, but the similar, and 
perhaps even more contested, relationship between freedom of re-
ligion and the right not to be discriminated against on the grounds 
of sexual orientation. Like Nussbaum, I call for difficulty in con-
sidering this relationship.  
There is a narrative which sees the question of gay rights as a 
political and practical one of progress: of hurdles to be overcome 
sequentially, beginning with campaigns to overturn legal bans on 
“sodomy,” then focusing perhaps on discrimination in employment 
and then to same-sex marriage, accompanied by the inevitable evo-
lution of public opinion in favor of such rights, with opposition to 
be fought against and overcome rather than capitulated to, and in 
any case irrelevant to the issue of others’ rights.5 This narrative is 
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not without merit. Certainly the advances made in some, but cer-
tainly not all, contexts have been extraordinary, and there is mo-
mentum behind the movement. Public opinion is also changing.6 
However, there is one aspect of this narrative that is unsatisfac-
tory: the aspect of how those, who for conscientious, religious rea-
sons, are unable to accept the proposition that gay relationships 
and sexuality are as worthy of protection as heterosexual ones, 
should be treated, and how their objections should be character-
ized.  
Nussbaum stated, “I am troubled by Okin’s argument, because 
she makes it all sound so easy.”7 In the context discussed in this 
article, there are at least two ways this conflict can be made “too 
easy.” The first is a problem with the narrative above, which 
writes off those who conscientiously believe that they cannot sup-
port such an advance as mere bigots and who, consequently, do not 
present an issue of legal or constitutional value. However, some-
times those who argue for greater exemptions for religious indi-
viduals and groups make a second and equally serious error. This 
is a failure to take the value of non-discrimination seriously, by 
reducing it to mere inconvenience or some other practical problem.  
This article considers these problems in the context of public 
accommodations and the provision of services, where a person, 
who does not share the religious beliefs of the service provider, 
demands non-discriminatory treatment. I will limit this discussion 
to their treatment by legal actors, rather than in the political or 
social spheres. It should be made clear though that these cases are 
the exceptions rather than the rule. In most cases, no conflict 
arises between the rights of non-discrimination and freedom of 
religion because either a person or an organization does not per-
ceive any conflict between their beliefs and non-discrimination or, 
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while they do have discriminatory8 beliefs, they do not consider 
that they are required to discriminate in the situation in question.9 
Nevertheless, conflicts do arise. 
THE TWO RIGHTS 
At this point it is necessary to say more about why the two 
rights of non-discrimination and freedom of religion should be val-
ued. Part of Nussbaum’s criticism of Okin was that she underval-
ued the benefits religion can bring to people. Nussbaum argued 
that it had an important role “in people’s search for the ultimate 
meaning of life; in consoling people for the deaths of loved ones 
and in helping them face their own mortality; in transmitting 
moral values; in giving people a sense of community and civic dig-
nity [and] in giving them imaginative and emotional fulfillment.”10 
Perhaps because of these benefits, religion can have an “identity-
generative”11 nature. It can be experienced not simply as an activ-
ity, but going to the very core of a person’s identity. Furthermore, 
freedom of religion is part of a broader value intrinsic to a liberal 
democracy that one should be free to seek one’s own ultimate con-
victions without state interference and should be able to live in 
accordance with these convictions, where possible, and compatible 
with others’ rights.12  
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Freedom of religion, including the protection of individual reli-
gious conduct, is therefore a right worthy of significant protection. 
Since religions typically lay down not only patterns of belief, but 
requirements to act in accordance with these beliefs, there should 
be some protection of religious conduct. Michael Perry argues that 
banning religious practices “causes serious human suffering: the 
emotional (psychological) suffering . . . that attends one’s being 
legally forbidden to live a life of integrity . . . to live one’s life in 
harmony with the yield of one’s religious conscience.”13 The basis of 
this article is that, given the importance of being able to live in 
accordance with one’s religious beliefs, while it would of course be 
impossible and highly undesirable to protect every religious prac-
tice, there should be consideration of whether it is possible to pro-
tect people’s conscientious actions and, further, denial of these re-
ligious practices is unwarranted “unless [the state] has good rea-
son to do so.”14 This idea was well expressed by Judge Sachs in the 
South African Constitutional Court who stated: 
The underlying problem in any open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom in which conscientious 
and religious freedom has to be regarded with appropriate seri-
ousness, is how far such democracy can and must go in allowing 
members of religious communities to define for themselves which 
laws they will obey and which not . . . . [B]elievers cannot claim 
an automatic right to be exempted by their beliefs from the laws 
of the land. At the same time, the state should, wherever rea-
sonably possible, seek to avoid putting believers to extremely 
painful and intensely burdensome choices of either being true to 
their faith or else respectful of the law.15  
It should be clear that these arguments do not depend on the value 
of any particular religious belief or on any sympathy for them, but 
on a deeper value of being able to live in accordance with one’s 
deeply felt convictions.  
An objection could be made that while a person may believe 
what he or she wants and may express these views and seek to 
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persuade others of their truth, this does not mean that a person 
necessarily has any rights to act on such beliefs, and it could fur-
ther be argued, there should certainly be no right to seek exemp-
tions from neutral and generally applicable laws. This was the po-
sition taken by the Supreme Court in Employment Division v. 
Smith.16 The literature (mostly) criticizing this decision is vast, 
and I cannot deal with every point here.17  
Some of the objections include that such an approach poses 
greater problems for unpopular minorities than for majorities be-
cause majorities have greater access to political means of change 
and therefore are likely to experience fewer conflicts between their 
beliefs and the law. Furthermore, the decision was based upon a 
tendentious reading of previous case law, which was distinguished 
on a flimsy basis and thus gave rise to an exception to the general 
rule of unclear meaning and extent.18 Finally, it does not easily fit 
within the text of the First Amendment. Rather, it permits inter-
ference with religious practices, “no matter how serious the inter-
ference, no matter how trivial the state’s nonreligious objectives, 
and no matter how many alternative approaches were available to 
the state to pursue its objectives with less impact on religion.”19 It 
provides no justification to those affected by the interference with 
religious practices other than that the religion was not deliberately 
targeted, which may be of little comfort and is certainly of little 
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practical use. It thus fails to take the importance of conscience and 
freedom of religion seriously. 
Free exercise is therefore of fundamental importance. How-
ever, so too is the right to non-discrimination. Discrimination not 
only deprives a person of tangible goods, such as a particular ser-
vice, thus leading to economic disadvantage, but more intangibly, 
through its stigmatic effect,20 it leads to a sense of exclusion, 
thereby undermining dignity and self-respect. This is particularly 
true because the problem is a cumulative one as many discrimina-
tory views are common throughout society, and therefore a person 
is likely to repeatedly experience such discrimination. As with 
freedom of religion, this principle can be misunderstood. Douglas 
Laycock reduces this serious problem to “the insult of being re-
fused service”21 and therefore seems to view it as an easy decision 
to protect discriminatory refusals of service relating to same-sex 
marriage. The concept of insult though does not fully comprehend 
why non-discrimination is a fundamental social value, since it 
suggests hurt pride and perhaps pettiness, rather than any essen-
tial moral value. A better explanation is that discrimination affects 
“equal citizenship”22 or, to put it another way, the fundamental 
obligation owed by the state is to treat everyone with “equal con-
cern and respect.”23 These principles “presumptively insist[] that 
the organized society treat each individual as a person, one who is 
worthy of respect, one who ‘belongs.’”24  
The state’s obligation is not only to refrain from acting in dis-
criminatory ways itself but its obligation is also, in some contexts, 
to prevent private actors from acting in discriminatory ways.25 As 
Ronald Dworkin puts it, “[A] political and economic system that 
allows prejudice to destroy some people’s lives does not treat all 
members of the community with equal concern.”26 Rather, it dem-
  
 20. Paul Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term–Foreword: In Defense of the 
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1976).   
 21. Douglas Laycock, Afterword to SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 189, 189-207 (Douglas Laycock et al., eds., 2008).  
 22. Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term–Foreword: Equal 
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1977).  
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onstrates an impermissible lack of interest in the welfare of its 
citizens or, more likely, that the discriminatory views are tacitly, 
or perhaps even explicitly, agreed with. Prohibitions on discrimi-
nation in, for example, employment and public accommodations 
are therefore required.  
The next question therefore is deciding whether the negative 
treatment is serious enough to require state protection against 
discrimination. There is extensive scholarship pointing to the his-
torical disadvantage suffered by gay people and to the social dis-
crimination gay people face, for example, in employment, housing, 
and in seeking legal recognition of their relationships.27 Addition-
ally, the existence of violent hate crime serves as a particularly 
abhorrent reminder of the levels of prejudice in existence.28  Of 
course there is also an inevitable moral aspect to referring to 
something as discrimination. We need to know what counts as dis-
crimination, or, to put it another way, what counts as an “alike” 
situation.29 As far as the state is concerned, heterosexual and gay 
people are relevantly alike because there is no neutral, non-
religious principle that adequately justifies the discriminatory 
treatment.30  
  
 27. See, e.g., David M. Huebner et al., Experiences of Harassment, Discrimi-
nation, and Physical Violence among Young Gay and Bisexual Men, 94 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 1200 (2004) (finding that 37% of men in the study reported experi-
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protection is emotionally described in JOHN CORVINO & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, 
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Among Sexual Minority Adults in the United States: Prevalence Estimates from a 
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gious beliefs. The state, however, is prevented from acting for religious reasons 
under the Establishment Clause. See also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) 
(holding bare animus is not an acceptable motive for prohibiting anti-
discrimination laws); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (holding morality is 
not a permissible basis for legislation where it affects liberty rights); NICHOLAS 
BAMFORTH & DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, PATRIARCHAL RELIGION, SEXUALITY, AND 
GENDER: A CRITIQUE OF NEW NATURAL LAW (2007); and JOHN CORVINO, WHAT’S 
WRONG WITH HOMOSEXUALITY? (2013).  
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However, just as there are limits to the value of freedom of re-
ligion, there are limits to the value of non-discrimination. As An-
drew Koppelman puts it:  
The antidiscrimination project represents a claim of enormous 
moral power: the demand that society recognize the human worth 
of all its members, that no person arbitrarily be despised or de-
valued. Yet as soon as we begin to try to carry it out, we find our-
selves in collision with other moral considerations, equally power-
ful, that demand that the project be a limited one.31  
Conflicts between religious rights and the prohibition of sexual 
orientation discrimination are therefore not only likely but also 
potentially serious. A choice must be made about which interest to 
protect at the cost of violating another important interest, thus 
presenting a difficult dilemma. What then is the correct attitude to 
take towards this choice?  
THE IDEA OF TRAGIC CHOICE 
Nussbaum has written about the idea of the “tragic choice”:32 a 
dilemma where there is a significant moral cost whichever decision 
is to be taken. She sees this in Sophocles’ Antigone.33 In the play, 
Antigone is prevented from burying her brother, Polynices, a trai-
tor, by Creon’s edict, because anyone who buries a traitor will be 
put to death. She decided to honor her religious commitment, thus 
disobeying Creon. There were serious moral considerations on both 
sides: Antigone’s religious obligation to bury her brother and 
Creon’s obligation to consider the welfare of the city. However, 
whichever decision Antigone would have made, one of these moral 
considerations would be violated. Nussbaum further argues that 
both Antigone and Creon failed in their moral duties by focusing 
on their own interest rather than noticing the tragic choice that 
must be made.  
The conflict between the religious individuals’ conscientious ob-
ligations and the obligation not to discriminate can also potentially 
give rise to a tragic choice, though it is not clear that Nussbaum 
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would necessarily perceive this in the same way. 34 She argues that 
there would be no tragic choice if a religious group refused to pro-
vide primary-level education to their children because it conflicted 
with a religious obligation, since a rejection of this claim would not 
deny them “a fundamental entitlement involved in the very notion 
of the freedom of conscience”35 and because granting an exception 
would “erode the foundations of civic order.”36 However, while pre-
venting discrimination in the types of circumstances referred to in 
this article would not deny those with religious objections “a fun-
damental entitlement involved in the very notion of the freedom of 
conscience,” the burden of being prevented from discriminating on 
the one side and the importance of the opposing interest in dis-
crimination, can give rise to a tragic choice.  
Nussbaum argues that if a choice is “tragic,” it gives rise to 
moral obligations, beyond the need to act morally in making the 
decision, including the obligation to regret having to make the 
choice and perhaps to express this or make amends in another 
way. A further responsibility, of crucial importance here, is to fully 
account for the interests in question; to, as stated above, not make 
this discussion “too easy.” 
Marie Failinger, in referring to disputes where religious land-
lords refuse to let their apartments to gay or unmarried couples, 
has referred to a similar obligation. 37 As she points out, cases in 
this context have often been resolved by reducing either the land-
lord’s or prospective tenants’ interests to money or inconvenience. 
Thus, the landlord is told that there is no conflict with her free 
exercise rights because she can avoid the conflict “. . . by selling 
her units and redeploying the capital in other investments.”38 Al-
ternatively the tenants are told that the only harm they have suf-
fered is a marginal reduction in the number of places to rent.39 The 
  
 34. Although in MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE 
OF AMERICA’S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008), she suggests conscience 
should be protected in a much greater number of circumstances than she seems 
to suggest in The Costs of Tragedy, supra note 32. 
 35. Nussbaum, supra note 32 at 1025. 
 36. Id. at 1026.  
 37. Marie A. Failinger, Remembering Mrs. Murphy: A Remedies Approach to 
the Conflict Between Gay/Lesbian Renters and Religious Landlords, 29 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 383 (2001).  
 38. Smith v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n., 913 P.2d 909, 925 (Cal. 1996). 
 39. Donahue v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Ct. App. 
1991), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992) (en banc), and review dismissed 
and cause remanded, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993) (en banc). 
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question then appears easy to the court. After all, a minor incon-
venience is nothing compared to the importance of protecting free-
dom of religion, and if there is not really a conflict between reli-
gious beliefs and the law, then this is nothing compared to the 
fundamental right not to be discriminated against. However, this 
is not an adequate explanation of the issues. Rather, it is impor-
tant to account fully for the losses caused. This means, when refer-
ring to religious claims, accounting for the loss and hurt caused by 
not being able to live out deep moral convictions, rather than dis-
missing claims outright. When referring to discrimination claims, 
this means not reducing the interest to one of mere inconvenience 
or limited economic harm, but to the fundamental importance of 
inclusion and non-discrimination as a moral value.  
This is part of a broader point. Emily Calhoun argues that we 
should think about the “constitutional losers” in litigation.40 It is of 
course in the nature of a legal system that there will be winners 
and losers, and this is not in itself problematic, but she argues that 
judges have obligations to the parties beyond deciding fairly who 
should win and lose. She links this to the idea of “constitutional 
stature” which all those who bring a rights case possess. Since 
they possess this constitutional stature, judges should not “charac-
terize constitutional losers as valueless, as persons whose consent 
does not matter to judicial legitimacy, as wrongdoers rather than 
worthy and respected proponents of non-frivolous constitutional 
arguments.”41 This “violates justices’” obligations to citizens and 
has the potential to cause outrage “outrage” among those who do 
not agree with the judgment, because they can correctly perceive 
that their claim is thought of as worthless.42 
This article will now discuss three case studies that demon-
strate these points. They all raise situations where a religious in-
dividual or organization has denied a service to a gay person or 
couple because of their sexual orientation, as they argue to do so 
would be contrary to their religious beliefs. My purpose here is not 
to analyze particular legal doctrines or to argue that these demon-
strate that there should or should not be an exemption, but a more 
normative one of asking what a good result and judgment, which 
fulfills the ethical demands argued for so far, should look like. 
  
 40. CALHOUN, supra note 33. 
 41. Id. at 4-5. 
 42. Id. 
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CASE STUDIES 
Elane Photography v. Willock 
In Elane Photography v. Willock43 a photography company re-
fused to photograph a lesbian couple’s commitment ceremony. The 
couple that owned the company, the Huguenins, said they would 
only photograph “traditional” weddings because they had a policy 
of only photographing events which complied with their religious 
beliefs, and they believed that same-sex marriage was immoral. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court granted summary judgment 
against Elane Photography, holding that they had not demon-
strated any defense to the discrimination. 
Although summary judgment was not necessarily inappropri-
ate, there are failures in the main decision in the obligation to re-
alize that this was a potentially tragic choice and to acknowledge 
the owners’ religious objections. Despite the fact that religion was 
at the center of their argument, their religious claims were not 
only unsuccessful, which is justifiable, but there was also no legal 
avenue under which they could be addressed. It was held they had 
no claim under the Free Exercise clause because the prohibition of 
discrimination did not selectively burden any religion or religious 
belief and was therefore a neutral and generally applicable law 
under Smith.44 While the New Mexico Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act45 would have given them an opportunity to raise their re-
ligious beliefs as a defense against a government agency, it did not 
apply here because the other party was a private individual.  
The essence of the Huguenins’ claim, that they are subject to a 
conscientious dilemma which asks them to choose between obeying 
the law and fulfilling their religious duty, therefore is not ad-
dressed because there is no cognizable religious claim. They there-
fore have “lost twice” under Calhoun’s formulation46 because they 
are not accepted as having a legitimate religious grievance. My 
argument is not at this point whether or not the Huguenins should 
have been successful, but only that they should have had available 
to them some cause of action which recognized the basis of their 
claim.  
  
 43. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).  
 44. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 45. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-1 (West). 
 46. CALHOUN, supra note 33. 
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It is because of this failure to recognize a religious basis of the 
claim that a weaker basis became important, that of free speech. 
As the court held though, this argument is artificial.47 The Hu-
guenins argued that they would be forced to express a message 
that they approved of same-sex marriage through their photogra-
phy if they were required not to discriminate and that this forced 
expression violated their free speech rights. However, as the court 
said:  
Reasonable observers are unlikely to interpret Elane Photogra-
phy’s photographs as an endorsement of the photographed events. 
It is well known to the public that wedding photographers are 
hired by paying customers and that a photographer may not 
share the happy couple’s views on issues ranging from the minor 
(the color scheme, the hors d’oeuvres) to the decidedly major (the 
religious service, the choice of bride or groom).48 
The couple’s claim was a claim of conscience not expression. 
Their real fear was not that people would mistake what their be-
liefs are, but that they did not wish to be involved in an activity 
they believed morally wrong. Although the failure of the speech 
argument is recognized, it is the failure of the law to appreciate 
the value of conscience which leads to the casting around for alter-
native arguments.  
However, there is a concurring judgment by New Mexico Su-
preme Court Justice Bosson that clearly perceives there is a tragic 
choice to be made between two important rights. He goes to some 
lengths to assure the Huguenins that their beliefs deserve our re-
spect, but then goes on to point out that their right to act on their 
beliefs cannot be absolute where it would affect others’ rights. He 
argues that it is essential in a multicultural and pluralistic society 
for everyone to compromise with those of different beliefs in some 
situations and concludes that the Huguenins cannot be permitted 
an exemption. Nevertheless, he states that this result, which re-
quires the Huguenins to either give up their business or act con-
trary to their beliefs, is “sobering.” This judgment gives a clear 
account of the different interests in the case and perceives that 
  
 47. For an opposing argument see James M. Gottry, Just Shoot Me: Public 
Accommodation Anti-Discrimination Laws Take Aim at First Amendment Free-
dom of Speech, 64 VAND. L. REV. 961 (2011)  
 48. Elane Photography, LLC, 309 P.3d at 69-70. 
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there is a difficult conflict of rights, thus respecting the obligations 
owed to constitutional losers.  
Even when all the relevant concerns are taken into account, 
the Huguenins should not be successful. They were providing a 
commercial service, and the link between their views and the dis-
approved of act is remote. This is not an argument that claims like 
the Huguenins are unintelligible because they maintain that the 
actions of another hurt their consciences. Their argument was not 
that they wished to interfere in another’s conscientious choice. 
Rather they argued that in assisting Willock they would thereby 
share in the fault. Assisting morally wrong acts is widely under-
stood by law and morality, both religiously based and not, to incul-
pate the assistor in some circumstances.  
However, not all assistance is equally morally culpable or in-
deed culpable at all. Daniel Sulmasy outlines how the Natural 
Law tradition provides a sophisticated understanding of whether 
cooperation affects conscience and whether assisting wrongdoing is 
permissible.49 The Natural Law tradition divides cooperation into 
formal and material cooperation. Formal cooperation is where the 
assistor shares the intent of the person doing wrong. This is al-
ways unacceptable. Material cooperation is where, as here, the 
intent is not shared. Whether this is acceptable depends on a 
number of factors.  Most relevant for present purposes is the prox-
imity to the morally culpable act. Other relevant factors are 
whether there is a causal link, as in the act would not take place 
without the assistor’s involvement, and finally whether assistance 
is likely to lead to “scandal.” This has the technical meaning of 
whether involvement is likely to lead others to believe that the 
person finds the act assisted morally acceptable and thus encour-
age others into committing the act under this mistaken belief. 
As there is no reason to impute any approval of the marriage to 
the Huguenins, the question of scandal does not arise. The Hu-
guenins’ act is also not very proximate to the marriage. They were 
only asked to take part in an act which was incidental to the com-
mitment ceremony and had no causal link to it, since the ceremony 
easily could have gone ahead without a photographer. This is not 
to deny the conflict that the Huguenins felt, but merely to conclude 
that, for the purposes of balancing their rights against other rights 
and interests, the interference with their rights was relatively mi-
  
 49. Daniel P. Sulmasy, What is Conscience and Why is Respect For it so Im-
portant?, 29 THEOR. MED. BIOETH. 135 (2008). 
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nor. Indeed it would have been possible for them to employ an-
other photographer to cover same-sex weddings.50 Although they 
may still argue that this is contrary to their beliefs, and of course 
it may be, the link is then extremely limited.  
In contrast, Willock’s rights were more fundamentally affected. 
It is important to go back to the point above that the stigma 
caused by this refusal and patterns of discrimination make this a 
serious issue. This is not a mere matter of “inconvenience” in find-
ing another provider as Laycock seems to suggest,51 as it would 
have been had the Huguenins simply been unavailable. Willock 
and her partner were able to find another photographer, but that 
does not remove the harm caused by the Huguenins, at least po-
tentially, to their sense of dignity and inclusion and to their right 
to feel like equal citizens. Additionally, from a slightly different 
perspective, there would also be a great difficulty in giving an ex-
emption because of its precedential value. There is nothing distinc-
tive about this case to distinguish it from any other where a person 
claims a religious exemption from providing a commercial service. 
Granting an exemption would therefore lead to an evisceration of 
the anti-discrimination principle and leave gay people in a state of 
considerable uncertainty as to whether or not they were entitled to 
receive a service.52 
This means the Huguenins are left with a conflict between 
their legal obligations and their beliefs. They must then decide 
whether to give up their business or to comply with the antidis-
crimination law. This is a matter of regret, which must be ac-
knowledged, but it is an unavoidable problem, given that not to do 
so would cause greater moral harm to Willock.  
Ward v. Polite53   
The second case I will discuss is more complex than Elane Pho-
tography, since it requires consideration of four organizations’ or 
  
 50. As suggested by now EEOC Commissioner, Chai Feldblum as noted in 
ROBERT K. VISCHER, CONSCIENCE AND THE COMMON GOOD: RECLAIMING THE SPACE 
BETWEEN THE PERSON AND STATE 303 (2009).  
 51. Laycock, supra note 21.  
 52. This is recognized but seemingly accepted by Laycock. Id. at 199 (“In 
more traditional communities, same-sex couples planning a wedding might be 
forced to pick their merchants carefully, like black families driving across the 
South half a century ago.”). 
 53. 667 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012).  
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individuals’ interests, in addition to the general public interest in 
eliminating discrimination. It does not involve the straightforward 
denial of services that arose in Elane Photography but a claim to 
be accommodated in professional training because of discrimina-
tory religious reasons. In Ward v. Polite, Ward, a counseling de-
gree student sought to avoid counseling a gay client if he sought 
help relating to his relationship because of her religious objections 
to affirming same-sex relationships. She therefore sought permis-
sion from the university, before she had begun counseling him, to 
transfer him to different student counselor. This was refused, and 
she was instead expelled from the course. The university held that 
she had failed to comply with the American Counseling Associa-
tion’s (ACA) Code of Ethics. This required a non-directional style 
of counseling where counselors were to “affirm” their clients’ val-
ues rather than to persuade them to accept their own values. It 
also prohibited discrimination on certain grounds including sexual 
orientation. It permitted, and in some cases required, referrals 
where a counselor did not have relevant expertise or considered 
that they could not help the client. 
The case was remanded to the district court for further consid-
eration of the factual issues, although the judgment is favorable to 
Ward. The case later settled.54 As with Elane Photography, the 
case was considered on two bases: free speech and free exercise. 
The question in relation to the free speech claim was whether the 
policy was reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The viewpoint neu-
tral policy the university sought to put forward was that it refused 
to permit students to refer clients. This argument was difficult to 
make, because the ACA did permit referrals where this was in the 
client’s best interests and because there was evidence that the 
university had permitted referrals in the past. This also made it 
difficult to demonstrate that the policy was neutral and generally 
applicable for the purposes of the free exercise claim. There was 
therefore a factual disagreement, which is why the case was re-
manded to the district court.  
Although certainly the court is right in that “at some point, an 
exception-ridden policy takes on the appearance and reality of a 
system of individualized exemptions, the antithesis of a neutral 
and generally applicable policy and just the kind of state action 
  
 54. Leigh Jones, Christian Counselor Bias Case Settled Out of Court, WORLD 
ON CAMPUS (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.worldoncampus.com/2012/12 
/christian_counselor_discrimination_case_settled_out_of_court.  
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that must run the gauntlet of strict scrutiny,”55 seeking only to 
demonstrate there was a neutral policy can only give a partial 
analysis of the interests at stake. It focuses attention on the 
somewhat tangential issue of whether anyone had been permitted 
to transfer clients and left the university in difficulty in explaining 
its point of view. The problem is that there is nothing necessarily 
suspect in having a non-absolute policy in terms of the purpose of 
the training. There is a difference, for example, between a student 
referring a client who is seeking bereavement counseling when she 
has recently suffered a bereavement,56 and referrals for discrimi-
natory reasons. The university’s training was designed to create 
counselors who complied with the professional ethics of a particu-
lar body. These ethics were not incidental, but rather directed how 
the whole relationship between counselor and client was meant to 
operate. A transfer for bereavement counseling would not affect 
this policy because it does not involve any moral disapproval of the 
person who has been bereaved. A transfer for discriminatory rea-
sons though does.   
As stated above, there are four groups or individuals whose in-
terests should be recognized as relevant to this dispute. These are: 
Ward, the client Ward was meant to counsel, her prospective fu-
ture clients, and the university. All must be accounted for since 
they are not necessarily coterminous. The Court argued, 
“[A]llowing a referral would be in the best interest of Ward (who 
could counsel someone she is better able to assist) and the client 
(who would receive treatment from a counselor better suited to 
discuss his relationship issues).”57 This may be persuasive if only 
this client’s interests are considered, but it does not address the 
full range of interests. Indeed, it may even understate the client’s 
interests. It is probably assumed that he would have been un-
aware of such a transfer, and therefore he suffered no injury. 
However, if such a policy did become public it may have caused 
him stigmatic injury because a person in a heterosexual relation-
ship would not have been transferred. He would not have received 
the same treatment due to his sexual orientation.  
More important is the wider interest the university has in 
promoting certain ways their trained counselors should act. As far 
as the university is concerned, its role is to train counselors in a 
  
 55. Ward, 667 F.3d at 740. 
 56. An example given in the case.  
 57. Ward, 667 F.3d at 740. 
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certain method of counseling, which must be accepted for the pur-
poses of training, even if it can be discarded or challenged at a 
later date. Furthermore, the interests of future clients are not con-
sidered in the judgment. This is the crucial issue. They would have 
a legitimate expectation that accredited counselors would abide by 
their professional body’s code of conduct, including its non-
discrimination requirements and would be trained to do so. Their 
interests are stronger here than in receiving normal commercial 
services without discrimination, because of their presumably vul-
nerable state when seeking counseling services.  
Of course, Ward’s interests must also be addressed. She had a 
genuine conscientious objection, which she sought to deal with in a 
way that would cause the least disruption to both the client and 
the course by seeking a referral at an early stage. It is also regret-
table that this issue arose in her final semester, when she had ap-
parently been a conscientious and competent student, thus pre-
venting her from graduating. Nevertheless, she still opposed a core 
value of her chosen profession, giving rise to a dilemma, which she 
felt she could not conscientiously ignore. Given the importance of 
non-discrimination to this career, therefore, despite the sincerity of 
her views and the fact that she only attempted to avoid a conflict 
rather than change others’ views,58 the university was justified in 
not giving her a transfer. 
However, this does not mean that Ward’s treatment was en-
tirely fair. The formal review to decide whether she should be dis-
missed from the course, at least in the way it is represented by the 
court, was questionable in that it did not treat her with full con-
cern and respect. It appeared to focus more on her religious beliefs 
than on her behavior and professional obligations, with one profes-
sor stating in his evidence that he took her “on a little bit of a theo-
logical bout”59 and another telling Ward during the review that she 
was “selectively using her religious beliefs in order to rationalize 
her discrimination against one group of people.”60 Of course, dis-
cussion of different moral and religious beliefs is good and, indeed, 
probably essential if a pluralistic society is to function, but it was 
not appropriate for this context. This is firstly because her profes-
sors were in a position of power. Secondly, it gives the appearance 
  
 58. Unlike the plaintiff in the factually similar case of Keeton v. Anderson-
Wiley, 664 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 59. Ward, 667 F.3d at 738. 
 60. Id. at 737. 
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of bias, leading to some basis for an allegation of religious dis-
crimination, even if there were sound reasons for the university’s 
decision. Thirdly, by challenging her deepest moral beliefs it failed 
to respect her as a person capable of moral reasoning and of adopt-
ing her own ultimate convictions. It should be emphasized that 
this conclusion only relates to the particular circumstances of this 
case: in many cases, of course, challenging deep moral beliefs is an 
important aspect of university education. Finally, by focusing on 
high level rather than low level reasoning,61 that is on the “Truth” 
about the morality of same-sex relationships according to Christi-
anity, a subject of deep complexity even for the most eminent theo-
logians, rather than what is required to comply with this code of 
ethics, the dispute becomes less capable of peaceful resolution and 
more likely to engender distrust and opposition. 
In conclusion then, the judge’s statement that denying Ward a 
referral because “her conflict arose from religious convictions is not 
a good answer; that her conflict arose from religious convictions for 
which the department at times showed little tolerance is a worse 
answer” is correct.62 She may have an understandable sense of an-
ger and discrimination. Nevertheless, she should not have an ex-
emption because of the interests of the university and her future 
clients. 
Without gainsaying anything said up to this point, some of the 
issues Ward raises are legitimate. The university and the ACA 
argue that they require students to engage in non-directional 
counseling, but it is difficult to think of what truly non-directional 
counseling would involve. If a client engaged in conduct widely 
perceived as abhorrent but which he considered to be morally ac-
ceptable, it seems unlikely that the reaction by the counselor to 
this would, or should be, one of neutrality or acceptance of his 
moral stance.63 The university and ACA are using a mask of neu-
trality to defend their Code of Conduct, when it is actually under-
pinned by a strong moral code, which takes as its starting point 
non-discrimination and a particular type of toleration.64 The point 
  
 61. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS DO 51 
(2001). 
 62. Ward, 667 F.3d at 737. 
 63. This point is made in the judgment. Id. 
 64. FRANK FUREDI, ON TOLERANCE: A DEFENCE OF MORAL INDEPENDENCE 
(2011). Furedi discusses different types of tolerance, and this kind of tolerance is 
what Furedi refers to as the newer type of tolerance. 
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is not that this is in any way problematic, but that the university 
is inevitably requiring students to follow its moral code.  
More generally, the case shows starkly the problem of how 
those with strong beliefs are likely to struggle in an environment 
which opposes these views. Ward could not follow both her reli-
gious convictions and the professional obligations intrinsic to her 
chosen career. It is possible that as the anti-discrimination norm 
becomes more entrenched and those who have opposing moral 
views less dominant,65 managing this conflict will become more 
difficult for some people, especially if they consider that the only 
way to manage this conflict is to either refuse to perform part of 
their duties or to resign. It is understandable that some arguing 
for religious rights has therefore adopted the language of ‘closet-
ing’ from gay rights discourse, arguing that they are being forced 
to keep their religious identity silent,66 although the adoption of 
this language may be partly due to a somewhat cynical attempt to 
portray strongly religious people as victimized minorities. Cer-
tainly the two situations are not identical. For gay people, 
throughout much of recent history, the stigma was such that it 
prevented any mention of relationships or sexuality and thus re-
quired them to keep an essential part of their identity secret for 
fear of losing their job or worse.67 There is no suggestion that peo-
ple with strong religious views will be required to keep this secret 
in a similar way, although there may be restrictions on offensive 
speech in the workplace.68 Furthermore, in general, it is inevitable 
that the more different a person’s beliefs are from the mainstream, 
the more likely conflicts are to arise. While I have argued that 
such conflicts must be recognized and alleviated where possible, in 
  
 65. For a thorough explanation on the effect that age has on views towards 
homosexuality–though this is not an inevitable or simple process see Oppen-
heimer et al., supra note 9. 
 66. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Lib-
erty Claims Have in Common, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL. 206 (2010). See also Carl F. 
Stychin, Closet Cases: Conscientious Objection’ to Lesbian and Gay Legal Equal-
ity, 18 GRIFFITH L. REV. 17 (2009) (providing comment on this from a progressive 
approach). 
 67. See William N. Eskridge, Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Estab-
lishing Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship 1961-
81, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 817, 820 (1997) (explaining that gay and lesbian profes-
sionals faced the prospect of losing their professional licenses and that “consen-
sual homosexual intercourse was a serious crime in all the states, and a felony in 
all but one.”). 
 68. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 605 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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many cases, because of the importance of the right of non-
discrimination, this must be given greater protection. The diffi-
culty this may pose for some, however, should not be underesti-
mated.  
Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association69 
So far this article has only discussed the value of individual 
conscience and religious belief. The third case involves slightly 
different interests from the other two cases discussed so far, be-
cause it involves a religious organization claiming control over the 
use of its property, rather than an individual refusing to provide a 
service, thus raising the issue of collective religious freedom in the 
relationship between religious organizations and non co-
religionists. Ira Lupu argues that conscientious objection is only 
relevant to individuals and not institutions on the basis that only 
people can feel the psychological effects of being forced to act in 
ways in which they disagree.70 It is of course true that the situa-
tion is different for organizations compared to individuals, particu-
larly because the emotional and psychological harm of being re-
quired to make an agonizing choice is not the same. Nonetheless, 
this does not mean that issues of religious conscience are not rele-
vant. 
Firstly, those within the religion may experience such a di-
lemma. A leader of a religious organization may argue that it goes 
against his71 conscience, and against his understanding of the or-
ganization’s religious precepts, to permit an activity which is con-
trary to the religious teachings on its premises. Permitting it may 
also cause hurt to religious members who may feel that a sacred, 
or at least religiously important, space is being despoiled in some 
way. In a more fundamental sense, conscience and religious beliefs 
are not merely valued because to do otherwise would cause psycho-
logical harm, but because freedom of belief is an essential part of 
human flourishing. Religious organizations promote conscience by 
allowing the continuation and dissemination of a religious mes-
  
 69. Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, No. PN34XB-03008 (N.J. 
Office of Admin. Law), available at http://www.adfmedia.org/files/OGCMA-
BernsteinRuling.pdf. 
 70. Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The 
Case of Employment Discrimination, 67 B. U. L. REV. 391, 419-22 (1987). 
 71. I use “his” deliberately here: discrimination against gay people is often 
accompanied by discrimination against women. 
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sage over time to both members and non-members and providing a 
source of teaching and support.72 The organization may have an 
interest in promoting a consistent religious message and thus con-
trolling the use of its property to ensure this message is not dis-
torted. As with religious individuals, it is not a full answer to say 
that they could avoid the conflict by not entering into commercial 
activities. Offering out space for hire may be an important source 
of income that is relied upon to fulfill the religious mission or used 
to spread general awareness of the religion.  
Ocean Grove is a resort, owned by a Methodist organization, 
which has its roots in the nineteenth century camp meeting re-
vival movement.73 On the resort was the Boardwalk Pavilion, 
which was used for religious services and concerts but could also 
be hired out for weddings. When not in use it was freely open to 
the public. A lesbian couple, Bernstein and Paster, who were resi-
dents of Ocean Grove, tried to book the Pavilion for their wedding 
but were refused on the basis that the Methodist Church did not 
approve of same-sex marriage. The couple was successful in their 
argument that the Pavilion was a place of public accommodation 
at the time, that Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association 
(OGCMA) had discriminated against the couple, and there was no 
free exercise defense under the approach in Employment Division 
v. Smith74 since there was no targeting of religious practice.  
Although a religious organization has an interest in controlling 
the use of its property, there are of course different kinds of prop-
erty. A church has a greater claim over the use of sacred places 
such as a chapel, than it does to premises used mainly as a source 
of income, not used for religious purposes, and rented out to all-
comers. The first question is therefore to assess to what extent the 
Pavilion should be characterized as a public or private space. I do 
not wish to use this distinction to set up a false dichotomy between 
public and private or to suggest that whether discrimination is 
permissible or impermissible should be coterminous with this dis-
tinction. However, ascertaining the character of the Pavilion is 
  
 72. The idea that religious organizations have their own rights is not new. 
The rise of the idea of corporate conscience is an interesting but problematic one. 
See VISCHER, supra note 50 (arguing that corporations should be able to claim 
conscience rights). 
 73. TROY MESSENGER, HOLY LEISURE: RECREATION AND RELIGION IN GOD’S 
SQUARE MILE 4-5 (2000). 
 74. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
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relevant in ascertaining the extent to which the rights of its own-
ers have been affected. 
On the one hand, Fredric Bold characterizes the Pavilion as 
private, arguing that “if the public sees religious institutions such 
as the Methodist pavilion owners allowing same-sex civil commit-
ment ceremonies on their premises, casual observers may errone-
ously think the Methodist church has changed its historic stance 
against same-sex marriage.”75 He also suggests that a ceremony 
would have received a great deal of media interest. This analysis 
makes the mere ownership of a place crucial. It follows that a reli-
gious organization should be able to prevent a use which it does 
not agree with on any premises it owns, no matter how attenuated 
its link to its religious mission. This would significantly reduce the 
protection given by the anti-discrimination norm. As it relates to 
this case it also fails to appreciate that the Pavilion was at least a 
partly public place. Although used for religious worship, it was not 
a church and was open to everyone. Non-Methodist and non-
religious weddings and other non-religious events had taken place 
there, with no indication that the church thereby endorsed them. 
Importantly also, OCGMA received a tax exemption for the Pavil-
ion on the basis that it was open to the public.  
In contrast to Bold, Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle depict the Pa-
vilion as public.76 They argue that, “Bernstein and Paster asked to 
use a facility that was not specifically identified with Methodist 
worship, that ordinary observers would see as public space, and 
that had been available for rental by anyone willing to pay the 
fee.”77 This is a more apposite characterization than Bold’s. Al-
though OGCMA is a religiously based organization, this does not 
thereby make the property it owns necessarily religious in nature. 
Given the particular circumstances and use to which the Pavilion 
was put, the religious interest is fairly small. The risk of confusion 
between the Methodist Church’s precepts and the actions it per-
mits on some of its property therefore appears remote. If OGCMA 
was particularly concerned about the risk that people would erro-
neously think that the Methodist Church endorsed same-sex wed-
dings, it could perhaps lessen this by having a sign saying that any 
  
 75. Fredric J. Bold, Vows to Collide: The Burgeoning Conflict between Reli-
gious Institutions and Same-Sex Marriage Antidiscrimination Laws, 158 U. PA. L. 
REV. 179, 202, 224 (2009). 
 76. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Equality and Religious Free-
dom, 5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y. 274, 285 (2010). 
 77. Id. 
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activity taking place in the Pavilion did not necessarily represent 
the views of the Methodist Church. Therefore, although OGCMA 
did have an interest in discriminating in the use of its property, it 
had not, with its present use, demonstrated a particularly strong 
interest. 
However, again this interest is only partly recognized by the 
judgment. It did not see any conflict between the law and 
OGCMA’s religious beliefs. The problems caused by Smith in rec-
ognizing and paying due attention to the religious interests in such 
situations are again obvious. It was held there was no relevant 
free exercise question because the Law Against Discrimination is a 
neutral law of general application designed to uncover and eradi-
cate discrimination; it is neither focused on nor hostile to relig-
ion.78 This is undoubtedly partly explained by the difficulty 
OGCMA had in demonstrating that it had historically shown any 
interest in making the use of the Pavilion compliant with its reli-
gious beliefs. 
In contrast to the weak discriminatory interest, Bernstein and 
Paster’s interest is strong. This is partly due to the “unfair sur-
prise” they faced.79 To them this was a quasi-public space, rather 
than a religious one, in the community to which they belonged. As 
the Administrative Judge put it, “[T]his was the first time in any-
one’s memory that a denial was based on a reason other than 
availability. During this period respondent maintained a Web page 
called An Ocean Grove Wedding, which advertised the Pavilion as 
a wedding venue. The page was silent regarding respondent’s 
views on marriage.”80 Others who had married there were not in-
formed there was any religious significance to their weddings tak-
ing place there, or asked whether their marriages conformed to 
Methodist teachings. To impose such a requirement only on a gay 
couple is therefore unfair and indeed may raise the question of 
whether OGCMA was really acting to protect its religious mission, 
or merely out of prejudice towards gay people. If that was the case, 
the situation ceases to be a “tragic choice” because there is no sig-
nificant moral harm caused to them here by the requirement not 
to discriminate. 
  
 78. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. 
 79. Laycock, supra note 21, at 198 (urging “unfair surprise” is an important 
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 80. Bernstein v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n, No. PN34XB-03008 (N.J. 
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Of course, none of this means that OGCMA necessarily had to 
allow anyone to use the Pavilion. Its obligation was only not to dis-
criminate, not to actively provide places for same-sex weddings. It 
could reconsider its use and use it only as a religious space if it so 
wished, meaning that the laws on non-discrimination in public 
accommodations did not apply to it. Indeed, this was the choice it 
made after the case was brought. The Pavilion was then classified 
for tax purposes as a religious property rather than a public one. 
Another lesbian couple later tried to make a complaint to the State 
of New Jersey’s Division of Civil Rights, when they tried to book 
the Pavilion for their wedding, but this was rejected on the basis 
there was no cause of action.81 The choice OGMGA was put to, 
while difficult, was not therefore an unfair one.  
CONCLUSION 
In a way, the purpose of this article has been to complicate 
rather than to simplify this issue. It has argued that both dis-
criminatory religious beliefs and the prohibition of sexual orienta-
tion discrimination are important rights, and that the conflict be-
tween the two should not be resolved by reducing the importance 
of the interest on one side and thus failing to see the existence of a 
deep conflict, something of which both courts and commentators 
have sometimes been guilty. A failure to see this as a “tragic 
choice,” in the same way as Creon failed to see Antigone’s di-
lemma, results in unfairness and in a moral failure to one of the 
parties. Rather, careful attention must be paid to elucidating the 
various interests, and whilst it will probably be necessary to pro-
tect one right over another, to acknowledge the difficulty this 
causes for one party.82 What is clear though, is that these issues 
are likely to remain controversial for some time and that with 
same-sex marriage being recognized in more places and with the 
growth of other laws prohibiting discrimination, particularly in 
  
 81. Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 76, at 279-80. 
 82. This article has not addressed the question of how and when conflicts 
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jurisdictions with significant conservative religious populations,83 
these issues are likely to continue to arise.  
 
  
 83. Kelly Catherine Chapman, Gay Rights, the Bible, and Public Accommo-
dations: An Empirical Approach to Religious Exemptions for Holdout States, 100 
GEO. L.J. 1783, 1790 (2012) (arguing that it is necessary for “holdout” states to 
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